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Doctoring Up the Capital Defense System: Raising
the Standards for Louisiana's Death Penalty Lawyers
INTRODUCTION

Serious questions arebeing raisedabout whether the death
penalty is beingfairly administratedin this country. If
statistics are any indication, the system may well be
allowing some innocent defendants to be executed.
-Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor'
There are currently ninety-two inmates sitting in silence on death
row at Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana.2 The majority
of those inmates were represented at trial by court-appointed counsel
because of their indigency. At least 192 additional indigent capital
defendants are awaiting trial in Louisiana.3 As early as 1932, the
United States Supreme Court held that where a criminal defendant
stands "in deadly peril"4 ofhis life, the notions ofdue process mandate
the appointment of counsel to represent him. Over two decades later,
the Court again held that death is different: "[t]he taking of life is
irrevocable. It is in capital cases especially that the balance of
conflicting interests must be weighed most heavily in favor of the
procedural safeguards ofthe Bill ofRights."5 After almost another two
decades, the Court reaffirmed this declaration, holding that "the penalty
of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long."6 The Court explained that "[d]eath, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs
from one of only a year or two."7 Though the members of the Court
have changed through the years, the opinion ofthe Court that death is
different has remained constant. This difference between capital
Copyright 2004, by LOUIsLANA LAW REVIEW

1. CB S
News,
available
at
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/07/03/supremecourt/printable299592.shtml (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
2. See Death Row U.S.A. Summer 2003; A quarterly report by the Criminal
Justice Project of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., at 27,
44-45, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
3. Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board, at www.lidab.com (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004). Figures are as of May 17, 2002.
4. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71, 53 S. Ct. 55, 65 (1932).
5. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 45-46, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1245 (1957) (on
rehearing) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991
(1976).
7. Id.
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punishment and any other criminal sanction commands a
"qualitatively" raised standard for the attorneys representing the
defendants whose lives are in "deadly peril."
This article will address the woefully inadequate standards of
competency currently required ofappointed capital defense counsel in
Louisiana. Because death is different, different standards are not only
appropriate, but mandated. Part I ofthis article explores the extent of
the problems relating to ineffective assistance of counsel in capital
cases, including the defendant's burden in proving ineffectiveness. Part
II explains the current standards for capital defense counsel as
recommended by the American Bar Association and contrasts those
with Louisiana's current competency standards. Part I of this article
examines the complex responsibilities held by an attorney representing
a capital defendant. Part IV explores the specialized training of a
surgeon as well as the specialized form of review of medical
malpractice claims. Finally, Part V parallels the critical and complex
nature of a surgeon's responsibilities to that of capital defense counsel
and recommends a completely new scheme for Louisiana in death
penalty cases.
I. THE MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

When we execute a capitaldefendant inthis country, we relyon
thebeliefthatthe individualwasguilty, andwasconvictedand
sentenced after afair trial,to justify the imposition ofstatesponsoredkilling... My 24yearsofoverseeingthe imposition
ofthedeathpenaltyfromthis Courthaveleft me in gravedoubt
whetherthisrelianceisjustifiedandwhetherthe constitutional
requirementofcompetent legalcounselfor capitaldefendants
is beingfulfilled.
-Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun9
8. This article will address only standards ofcounsel as they apply to indigent
defendants. This article will not address issues offunding or counsel compensation
in capital cases. But see James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why
There is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It 370-71
(2002) [hereinafter Liebman, Broken System] ("The main reason inexperienced,
unskilled and untrained lawyers are often the only ones who seek capital trial
assignments-the most demanding assignments lawyers can receive-and the main
reason the performance of even conscientious appointed capital lawyers is often
below par, is the low level of compensation and reimbursement for expenses
[investigators, mental health exams, DNA testing and the like] that is available in
most states. Because funds for capital trial lawyers and for necessary support
services often come out of state court operating budgets, it is not surprising that our
aggregate-level analyses reveal a link between financially strapped state courts and
high rates of capital error.") (emphasis omitted).
9. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1264, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2790 (1994)

2003]

COMMENTS

A. The ExtensivenessofIneffectiveness
Every criminal defendant has a constitutional guarantee to the
"assistance of counsel for his defence,"' 0 "not for [his] own sake, but
because of the effect it has on the ability ofthe accused to receive a fair
trial."" Likewise, the Louisiana Constitution guarantees a fair trial to
every person charged with a crime in Louisiana.'2 These constitutional
mandates ofthe assistance of counsel and a fair trial require that each
capital conviction be reviewed before the sentence can be executed.
Death sentences take years to carry out. The average capital convict in
Louisiana sits on death row for six years before execution. 3 Delays
include direct appeal, 4 state post-conviction proceedings, 5 and federal
habeas corpus claims. 6 At some point in this process, the convicted
capital defendant almost always raises an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Much time and judicial resources are expended in
reviewing these claims post-trial.' 7 Unfortunately, the defendant's
burden of proof in ineffective assistance claims is obscure.'

(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)(mem.).
10. U.S. Const. amend. VI.

11. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,658, 104 S.Ct. 2039,2046 (1984).
12. La. Const. art. I, § 16 ("Every person charged with a crime is presumed
innocent until proven guilty and is entitled to a speedy, public, and impartial trial
in the parish where the offense or an element of the offense occurred, unless venue
is changed in accordance with law. No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself. An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to present a defense, and to
testify in his own behalf.").
13. Liebman, Broken System, supranote 8, Figure 17.
14. See La. Const. art. 5, § 5(D)(2); La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.9; Louisiana
Sup. Ct. R. XXVIII.
15. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 924, et seq.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2003), etseq.
17. Liebman, Broken System, supra note 8, at 173 ("As backlogs of capital
verdicts awaiting review increase, the number reviewed-and thus the number
available to be and that actually are reversed-decreases sharply. At some pointabout where the backlog of unreviewed verdicts reaches 20--the system appears to
shut down, with virtually no cases being reviewed or reversed. This suggests that
as the number ofdeath verdicts awaiting review increases, they so clog the appellate
system that it ceases to function as a means ofmoving valid death verdicts forward
to execution and for diverting flawed verdicts back for retrials. In that event,
unclogging the system would require fewer death verdicts, fewer flaws demanding
extended review, or both.") (emphasis omitted).
18. See Anthony Lewis et al., The Death ofFairness?Counsel Competency
and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1105, 1110 (1994)
("With its Stricklanddecision in 1984, the Court virtually said that anythingdone
by a defense lawyer will be regarded as constitutionally adequate.") (citation
omitted).

L 0 UISIANA LA W REVIE W

[Vol. 64

In Stricklandv. Washington, 9 the United States Supreme Court
delineated two requirements for a successful claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must show that trial
counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that
counsel erred so seriously that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" which the Sixth Amendment guarantees. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Satisfying this second prong requires a showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial-a trial whose result is reliable. Thus, Strickland requires
counsel's assistance to be effective and further holds that assistance
which is ineffective in preserving fairness does not meet the
constitutional mandate. 2 ' The United States Supreme Court has also
recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel."2 Accordingly, merely having an attorney by
the defendant's side during trial fails to satisfy the guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment. For a Stricklandclaim to prevail, the defendant
must prove that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the sentencer would have weighed the
balance of aggravating and mitigating factors to find that the
'
circumstances did not warrant the death penalty."23
The long line of cases interpreting Strickland reflects various
attitudes, viewpoints, and ideas about what constitutes ineffective
assistance ofcounsel. All of these various attitudes, viewpoints, and
ideas aside, one simple truth remains: ineffectiveness does exist in
defense counsel. And regardless of the legal test used, that
ineffectiveness prejudices the very defendant that the Sixth
Amendment was written to protect. Studies byThe Innocence Project
reveal that of the first seventy recent DNA exonerations, bad
lawyering was a common factor that led to wrongful conviction in
twenty-three of those cases, 24 or thirty-two percent.

Another

comprehensive study shows that egregiously incompetent defense
lawyering accounts for thirty-seven percent of state post-conviction

19. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
20. State v. Hampton, 818 So. 2d 720, 731 (La. 2002) (Knoll, J., dissenting).
21. Strickland,466 U.S. at 685-86, 104 S. Ct. at 2063--64 (1984).
22. McMannv. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 n.14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 n.14
(1970) (emphasis added).
23. Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1042 (11th Cir. 1994), quoting Bush v.
Singletary, 988 F.2d 1082, 1090 (11 th Cir. 1993).
24. See
The
Innocence
Project,
available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/index.php (last visited Jan. 9,2004). The
Innocence Project is a nonprofit legal clinic which handles cases where postconviction testing of evidence can yield conclusive proof of innocence.
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reversals.25 Other extensive research has found that the reversal rate
due to incompetent lawyering is as high as forty percent.26
On ineffectiveness, Justice Johnson of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals recently described the pitfalls of the criminal
justice system by pointing out that before appellate review, neither
criminal defendants, trial judges, nor opposing counsel can stop an
ineffective performance by defense counsel. He noted that following
trial, "even ifwe as appellate justices believe in good conscience that
we have identified an ineffective performance, we are unable to
satisfy the standard of review imposed upon us... The bar has no
effective program to identify, mentor, or eliminate ineffective defense
counsel."" The problem lies not just in the competency of trial
counsel but also in applying the standard of review at the appellate,
post-conviction, and habeas levels. Nonetheless, the problem begins
at the trial level. In his June 18, 2002 testimony before the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Barry Scheck, co-founder
ofThe Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School ofLaw,
Yeshiva University, stated, "[N]othing guarantees the conviction of
the innocent more than incompetent, ill-trained, or ineffective defense
counsel."28
Applying the statistical research of reversals for ineffectiveness
to the current number ofLouisiana death row inmates, over one-third
of those currently sitting on death row will most likely have their
convictions overturned because of the ineffectiveness of their
counsel. Assuming all 192 currently awaiting trial are convicted and
sentenced to death, over two-thirds of those could ultimately be
reversed due to bad lawyering.
B. Ineffective Assistance of CounselClaims in OtherStates
Not only are the reversal rates high for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, but the statistics reveal even more. The Table in
Appendix A shows that in thirty capital case opinions rendered in the
previous five years by state and federal courts wherein either a
reversal was ordered based upon the ineffective assistance ofcounsel
25. James Liebman et al., Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995 6 (2000).
26.
27.

Liebman, Broken System, supranote 8, at 414.
Smith v. State, 17 S.W.3d 660, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 5/17/00), quoting

Devis v. State, 18 S.W.3d 777, 787 n.1(Tex. App. 2000) (Johnson, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
28. Protecting the Innocent: Proposals to Reform the Death Penalty:
Testimony, United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary (June 18, 2002)
(statement
of Barry
Scheck),
available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print testimony.cfm?id=290&wit-id=663 (last visited
Feb. 1,2004).
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or a remand for an evidentiary hearing was ordered, in ninety-seven
percent of the cases counsels' errors could have been avoided with
additional education and training. As reflected by the Chart in
Appendix A, twenty-one (or seventy percent) of the thirty cases29
were reversed or remanded based on trial counsel's failure to
investigate or adequately present mitigating evidence in the penalty
phase. In each of these twenty-one cases, mitigating evidence was
either abundant and available, or counsel simply failed to look for
it. Specifically, in Simmons v. Luebbers,30 evidence existed that the
defendant's father had a drinking problem and beat the defendant's
mother in front of the defendant. The defendant had an IQ of 83
and would urinate on himself prior to beatings because he was so
scared. As a result, he ran away from home at the age of twelve and
was assaulted, possibly raped. The defendant also frequently
witnessed street violence in his impoverished neighborhood."
Rather than presenting any of this evidence, Simmons's counsel
merely introduced the testimony of Simmons's mother, who stated
that she loved her son and would draw value from a continued
relationship with him.32 It is no wonder, with a presentation such as
this, that the jury recommended the death sentence. Even more
alarming is the case ofAbdur'Rahman v. Bell.33 There, trial counsel
failed to investigate or present any mitigating evidence despite its
availability and abundance. Specifically, in addition to family and
personal histories of mental illness and voluminous mental health
records, evidence adduced at the habeas hearing showed that the
defendant suffered severely at the hands ofhis father who regularly
beat the defendant with a leather strap. Defendant's father "made
him take off his clothes, placed him hog-tied in a locked closet, and
tethered him to a hook with a piece of leather tied around the head
of his penis. Petitioner's father struck Petitioner's penis with a
baseball bat., 34 As punishment for smoking, the defendant's father
required him to eat a pack of cigarettes, and when defendant
vomited, he was made to eat the vomit. The habeas court found that
none ofthis extraordinary abuse, which clearly constitutes relevant
29. This sample of cases was obtained by running the following query on the
Westlaw database of all state and federal cases: sy((capital /3 crime punishment
offense murder) "death penalty" /p ineffective /5 counsel attorney lawyer).
30. 299 F.3d 929 (8th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923, 123 S. Ct. 1582
(2003).
31. 299 F.3d at 936.
32. Id. at 937.
33. 999 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Tenn. 1998), affd inpart,rev'din part,226 F.3d
696 (6th Cir.2000), cert.dismissedas improvidently granted,573 U.S. 88, 123 S.
Ct. 594 (2002), reh 'g denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S. Ct. 1344 (2003). (Issue on
certiorariwas prohibited "second or successive" habeas petitions.).
34. 999 F. Supp. 1073, 1097-98 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
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mitigating evidence, was heard by the jury and that "[t]his was a
grave omission by defense counsel."35
In eight (or twenty-seven percent) of the thirty cases reviewed,
counsel failed to investigate or adequately present guilt-phase
evidence or made other trial-related legal errors. These errors
included failing to read the juror questionnaires until after trial,
where one juror's questionnaire indicated an automatic vote for
death after conviction, 36 as well as failing to properly advise the
defendant about the law regarding a guilty plea. Inother cases,
counsel advised the defendant based on an erroneous interpretation
of the law,38 failed to investigate the validity of or object to the use
of defendant's prior convictions offered for enhancement
purposes, 39 and failed to investigate orpresent a potential alternative
defense despite evidence in counsel's possession that supported the
alternative theory, presenting rather a defense in which counsel had
no belief.4"
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims in Louisiana
The most recent Louisiana capital case wherein a reversal was
granted because the defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel is State v. Hamilton.4 In the penalty phase of Hamilton's
trial, defense counsel made no opening statement, presented no
evidence, and presented no witnesses. While the defendant's life
hung in the balance, trial counsel's only penalty phase presentation
was a 143-word closing argument in which he suggested that the
defendant had mental health problems and in which he reminded the
42
jurors of their promise to deliberate in determining a penalty.
35. Id. at 1098.
36. Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628 (Mo. 2002).
37. Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2002).
38. Commonwealth v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 2000).
39. Ex parte Patterson, 969 S.W.2d 16 (Tx. Crirn. App. 1998).
40. Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001).
41. 699 So. 2d 29 (La. 1997).
42. Defense counsel made the following closing argument:
May it please the Court. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Mr. Henry
[district attorney] has suggested that you should have your minds made up
about the penalty. If you do then I will have failed miserably in the jury
selection process. Each of you promised me that you would deliberate and
consider again in determining a penalty if the trial went into that phase. I
now ask each of you to honor that promise.
William Hamilton has a long history of mental illness, all of his life he's
been sick. Three years in a Texas insane asylum. Two doctors who
testified that he is a schizophrenic. He's certainly laboring under a
serious, serious disease. The District Attorney has pointed out his past
transgressions. He has suggested that vengeance is a reason for imposing
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Hamilton's trial was in 1992, well before the Louisiana Supreme
Court authorized the promulgation and implementation of
certification standards for defense counsel in Louisiana capital
cases.
Since Hamilton, no Louisiana reviewing court has reversed a
capital conviction or sentence because ofineffectiveness ofcounsel.
Although a logical conclusion one could draw from this fact is that
the current certification scheme has cured ineffectiveness problems,
the author submits that just the opposite has occurred.
Ineffectiveness still exists, even in counsel who are "certified"
under the current Supreme Court rules. The reviewing courts,
however, use Strickland as a scapegoat, holding that either the
actions of counsel were strategic and therefore not negligence, or
that the complaining defendant failed to make the required showinA
that the actions or inactions of counsel prejudiced the defendant.9
For example, in Haynesv. Cain," defendant's appointed counsel
conceded to the jury in his opening statement that the defendant had
kidnaped, raped, and robbed the victim, but that the defendant was
guilty of second degree, rather than first degree murder. During the
trial, the defendant advised the trial court outside the presence ofthe
jury that he did not agree with his attorneys' concessions, but the
court denied his request that new attorneys be appointed to represent
him. In his federal habeas proceedings, the Court held that the
defendant's attorneys' actions constituted strategy and therefore
were not ineffectiveness. A three-judge dissent correctly observed
that defense counsel's concession to the defendant's guilt to second
degree murder was "the functional equivalent to a forced guilty plea
over the objection of the defendant," and that controlling
jurisprudence "clearly establish[ed] that the Sixth Amendment is
violated when counsel concedes the accused's guilt to a lesser crime
'
over the accused's express objection."45
a death penalty. But to whom does vengeance belong? Thank you.
Id.at 32.
43. See State v. Duncan, 802 So. 2d 533 (La. 2001), cert.denied,536 U.S. 907,
122 S.Ct. 2362 (2002) ("Defense counsel apparently was aware of [certain]
information and decided for strategical reasons not to introduce such evidence..
.. "); State v. Hoffman, 768 So. 2d 542, 579 (La. 2000), cert. denied,531 U.S. 946,
121 S.Ct. 345 (2000) ("the defendant has not 'overcome the strong presumption
that [counsel's actions] might be considered sound trial strategy."'); State v. Snyder,
750 So. 2d 832 (La. 1999) (defendant failed to show that trial counsel's failure to
make a Batson objection to the prosecution's improper use of peremptory
challenges to exclude African Americans from the jury satisfied the prejudice prong
of the Stricklandtest).
44. 298 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.denied, 537 U.S. 1072, 123 S.Ct. 676
(2002).
45. Id. at 386-87 (5th Cir. 2002).
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Similarly, in State v. Louviere,4 6 where the defendant was
represented by two trial attorneys who were certified under the
current Louisiana standards, the defendant argued on direct appeal
that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to
first degree murder because of his lack of understanding of the
elements of the crime at the time of his plea. The defendant's
penalty phase trial ended in a death sentence and the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in an unpublished appendix, essentially considered
the plea a strategic maneuver, holding:
It is difficult to conceive two highly skilled defense
attorneys, both of whom specialize in capital litigation,
would be completely ignorant of the elements which
constitute first-degree murder . . . In addition, despite
defense counsel's anticipation ofa life sentence in exchange
for the defendant's guilty plea, an unsupported belief, hope,
or expectation of a certain sentencing outcome does not
provide a basis for withdrawal of a plea.4 7
Comparing this holding with Columbia Law School Professor
James Liebman's professional opinion that "not many lawyers are
reckless enough to advise clients to plead guilty to capital murder
without an agreement or understanding that doing so will avoid the
death penalty,"4' the question arises whether the current Louisiana
certification standards are sufficient to protect a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, or whether Louisiana is merely
placing an attorney by the defendant's side as a pure formality.
II. CURRENT MINIMUM STANDARDS

[T]he question with which we must deal is not whether a
substantialproportionofAmerican citizens would today, if
polled, opine that capitalpunishment is barbarouslycruel,
but whether they would find it to be so in light of all
informationpresently available.
-Justice Thurgood
Marshall 9

46.

833 So. 2d 885 (La. 2002), cert. denied, _

U.S. _,

124 S. Ct. 56

(2003).
47. 833 So. 2d 885, app. at 3.
48. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
2030, 2108 (2000) [hereinafter Liebman, Overproduction].
49. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2789 (1972).
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A. American BarAssociation'sGuidelinesfor Appointment and
Performanceof Counselin Death Penalty Cases
In 1989, the American Bar Association ("Association") adopted
national guidelines ("Guidelines") for performance of counsel in
capital cases. These Guidelines were revised in 2003 and, although
not binding on any jurisdiction, they have been cited approvingly as
professional standards by the United States Supreme Court. ° The
Association announced that the objective of providing counsel in
capital cases is to ensure high quality legal representation in "all
stages of every case in which the jurisdiction may be entitled to seek
the death penalty."'" Official commentary to Guideline 1.1 of the
American Bar Association states:
The quality of counsel's "guiding hand" in modem capital
cases is crucial to ensuring a reliable determination of guilt
and the imposition of an appropriate sentence. Today, it is
universally accepted that the responsibilities of defense
counsel in a death penalty case are uniquely demanding, both
in the knowledge that counsel must possess and in the skills
he or she must muster. At every stage of a capital case,
counsel must be aware of specialized and frequently changing
legal principles, scientific developments, and psychological
concerns. Counsel must be able to develop and implement
advocacy strategies applying existing rules in the pressurefilled environment ofhigh-stakes, complex litigation, as well
as anticipate changes in the law that might eventually result
in appellate reversal of an unfavorable judgment.
Under the standards set out by the Supreme Court for
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, even
seriously deficient performance all too rarely leads to reversal.
Hence, jurisdictions that continue to impose the death penalty
must commit the substantial resources necessary to ensure
effective representation at the trial stage. 2
Because of the complex and specialized nature ofcapital defense
representation, the American Bar Association recommends that no
fewer than two qualified trial attorneys be appointed to represent the
defendant on trial for his life. 3 Each of these attorneys must
50. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (2000).
51. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 1.1 (2003).
52. Id. at Guideline 1.1 cmt. (citations omitted).
53. Id. at Guideline 4.1. (This guideline also recommends that every capital
defense team include both an investigator and a mitigation specialist in addition to
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demonstrate substantial knowledge and understanding ofprocedural
and substantive law and possess specialized skill in trial advocacy, in
the use of experts and scientific evidence, and in investigating and
presenting mental health and mitigating evidence.5 4 The Guidelines
recommend that states implement comprehensive training programs
for capital defense counsel to equip counsel with the unique
knowledge and skill required for providing high quality legal
representation." The American Bar Association recommends that the
training include legal instruction as well as training in "related
substantive areas of mitigation and forensic science, "practical
instruction in advocacy skills," and "presentations by experienced
practitioners."56
B. Louisiana StandardsRelating to the ProvisionofCounsel to
IndigentsAccused ofCapitalCrimes
In 1994, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted Louisiana
Supreme Court Rule XXXI, which established the Louisiana Indigent
Defender Board, later renamed the Louisiana Indigent Defense
Assistance Board ("LIDAB"). The current version of Louisiana
Supreme Court Rule XXXI 57 became effective on January 1, 1998,
no fewer than two attorneys.).
54. Id. at Guideline 5.1.
55. Id. at Guideline 8.1.
56. Id. at Guideline 8.1 and cmt.
57. Rule XXXI provides, in pertinent part:
A. Standards Relating to the Effectiveness of Indigent Defense Counsel.
(1) Capital Litigation. In all capital cases, the following standards shall be
applicable to the defense of indigents:
(a) In any capital case in which a defendant is found to be indigent, the
court shall appoint no less than two attorneys to represent the defendant.
At least two of the appointed attorneys must be certified as qualified to
serve in capital cases as provided below. The court shall designate one of
the appointed attorneys to be lead counsel, the other(s) as associate
counsel. The court shall only designate as lead and associate counsel
those attorneys who have either been previously certified by the Louisiana
Indigent Defender Board and whose certification is still in good standing
or those attorneys who, after December 31, 1997, may be certified by the
district court judge handling the case pursuant to Paragraph (b) of
Subsection 1 of this Section. The certification of attorneys by district
court judges shall remain in effect until such time as the Indigent Defense
Supplemental Assistance Board is able to review and evaluate the
standards and capital certification procedures for either continuation,
discontinuation, or modification.
(b) Until such time as the Indigent Defense Supplement Assistance Board
shall address this matter, each district judge, presiding over a capital case,
shall maintain and enforce the capital certification procedures previously
developed by the Louisiana Indigent Defender Board.
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and provides qualifications for defense counsel ofcapital indigents in
Louisiana. Pursuant to Rule XXXI, LIDAB is charged with certifying
defense counsel for capital indigent defendants. Further, Rule XXXI
expressly requires the appointment of no less than two attorneys to
represent the defendant, both of whom must meet the LIDAB
certification requirements, and the court must designate one as lead
counsel and the other as associate counsel.58 The basic standards for
attorney certification prescribed by LIDAB include familiarity with
the practice and procedure of the criminal courts of Louisiana and
membership in good standing of the Louisiana Bar or admission to
practicepro hac vice.59 Additionally, counsel must have familiarity
with the use of expert witnesses and evidence, including, but not
limited to, psychiatric and forensic evidence60 Moreover, LIDAB
requires capital counsel to complete, within one year of application
for certification, a minimum of twelve hours of Board-approved
training primarily involving advocacy in the field ofcapital defense. 6'
Counsel must thereafter complete an additional twelve hours per year
to maintain their certification.62
As for experience, LIDAB's minimum standards for certification
require that lead trial counsel have five years of litigation
experience, 63 apparently in any field. In addition, lead trial counsel
must have experience as lead counsel in at least nine jury trials tried
to completion, but only five of those trials must have been felonies,
or two must have involved the charge of murder. 64 Trial associate
counsel only needs three years of litigation experience, 65 again
apparently in any field, and experience as lead counsel in at least
three felony jury trials tried to completion, including
66 service as lead
or associate counsel in at least one homicide trial. A close reading
of these minimum standards reveals that a commercial litigation
attorney who, perhaps as a favor, has tried a few low-grade
felonies-maybe a few felony DWIs, drug offenses, or criminal
damage to property charges--can qualify under Louisiana's scheme
to represent a capital defendant by merely attending a twelve-hour
seminar. Moreover, nothing in these standards requires that counsel
58. Louisiana Sup. Ct. Rule XXXI(A)(1)(a).
59. Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board, Standards of Indigent
Defense for the State of Louisiana, Ch. 7-1.1, available at
www.lidab.com/Acrobat/20files/capital%20certification%2ORules.pdf(last visited
Mar. 9, 2004).

60. Id. at Ch. 7-1.2.

61. Id. at Ch. 7-1.3-4.
62. Id.
63. Id. at Ch. 7-2.1(A).

64. Id. at Ch. 7-2.1(B).
65. Id. at Ch. 7-3.1(A).
66. Id. at Ch. 7-3.1(B).
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be successful in any of his prior cases. By merely having tried the
requisite number of trials and attending a seminar, counsel may be
certified by LIDAB. These minimum requirements will invariably
allow minimally qualified counsel to receive "the most demanding
assignment" 67 a lawyer can receive.
Unfortunately, the insufficiencies of the minimum standards are
only the beginning of the problem for Louisiana indigent capital
defendants. Pursuant to Louisiana Code ofCriminal Procedure article
512, an attorney assigned in a capital case must have been admitted
to the bar for at least five years. This requirement is consistent with
the language of Rule XXXI, and both the article and the rule are
facially binding on all courts in Louisiana. However, Louisiana
Supreme Court Rule XXXI(B) has a built-in escape clause which
provides that the rules set forth in Rule XXXI "shall not be construed
to confer substantive or procedural rights in favor of any accused..
,68 Thus, the only enforceable minimum standard requirement in
Louisiana for capital defense counsel is the requirement that lead
counsel have at least five years of litigation experience. None of the
other standards set forth by LIDAB accords the defendant a basis for
complaining when the trial court appoints an attorney who does not
meet the minimum requirements established by LIDAB. A defendant
whose appointed counsel does not meet any of the other standards,
and thus is appointed in violation of Rule XXXI, has no remedy.
Each time this issue has been raised, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has fallen back on the language of Rule XXXI(B) and held that no
remedy is available.
In State v. Gradley,69 two attorneys were appointed to represent
the defendant who was on trial for first degree murder. Neither
attorney was certified to serve in a capital case at the time of trial.
Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "the failure of
certification does not constitute a ground for reversal,"70 since Rule
XXXI expressly provides that no substantive or procedural rights are
conferred on the defendant by the Rule. Similarly, in State v. Perez,71
the defendant challenged his conviction of first degree murder on the
basis that the trial court allowed a third-year law student to assist lead
counsel by making the opening statement, arguing motions during
trial, cross-examining two State witnesses, and questioning five
medical experts on direct examination. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal held that the defendant failed to show any prejudice
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
2000).

Liebrnan, Broken System, supranote 8, at 371.
Louisiana Sup. Ct. Rule XXXI(B).
745 So. 2d 1160 (La. 1998).
Id. at 1165.
745 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), writ denied,768 So. 2d 32 (La.
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as a result of the law student's participation and further, that "nothing
in the new Rule XXXI bars Rule XX student practitioners from
participating in capital cases."72 The Court simply ignored the
requirement that two certified counsel are to be appointed to represent
a capital defendant. Likewise, in State v. Jones,7 3 the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled that an indigent capital defendant has no
statutory or recognized right to two attorneys, despite LIDAB's
standards. Essentially, -the standards provided under Louisiana's
current capital defense scheme have no teeth. The minimum
standards maintained by LIDAB under the umbrella of Rule XXXI
are merely illusory recommendations that fall short of the letter and
spirit of the American Bar Association's objective ofproviding high
quality legal representation. Simply stated, Louisiana's standards are
too basic and unenforceable, and capital defendants have no remedy
when the courts fail to comply.
III.

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF CAPITAL DEFENSE LITIGATION

Professor Liebman of Columbia Law School has described the
counsel situation in capital cases as worse than those in noncapital
cases in two important respects. Specifically, Professor Liebman
points out that capital representation is engulfed in a "hugely
complicated body of specialized law," the sentencing trials are more
"far-ranging, expert-dependent, and factually complex than the guilt
phase," and settlement negotiations in a capital case are "harder and
more sophisticated than in other kinds of cases."74 Commentary to
the American Bar Association's Guideline 1.1 memorializes the
principle that death is different, and warns that counsel representing
a client on trial for his life "must make extraordinary efforts on behalf
ofthe accused., 75 The authors ofthe commentaries, intent on making
their point clear, add that "[t]he level of attorney competence that
may be tolerable in non-capital cases can be fatally inadequate in
capital ones." '76
The Association's Guidelines set forth, in addition to
qualifications, certain minimum tasks that should be performed by all
capital defense counsel in every capital case. To begin, counsel
should conduct independent investigations for both guilt and penalty
phases, beginning immediately upon appointment and regardless of
overwhelming evidence ofguilt. Sources ofthe investigation should
72. Id. at 179.
73. 707 So. 2d 975 (La. 1998).
74. Liebman, Overproduction,supra note 48, at 2102-08.
75. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 1.1 cmt (citation omitted).
76. Id. at Guideline 10.1 and cmt (citation omitted).
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include, where available, the charging documents, the accused,
potential witnesses, police and prosecution, physical evidence, and
the scene." The investigations should prepare counsel for defending
the allegations of the State that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged as well as for presentation of the penalty phase and assisting
the jury in determining that the defendant should not be sentenced to
death. Further, counsel should establish a relationship of trust and
maintain close contact with the client7 and preferably with the
client's closest friends and family members, if possible. Defense
counsel should also investigate and consider all legal claims
potentially available, evaluating each in light ofthe uniqueness ofthe
case and death penalty law.79 Since failure to raise every legal claim
may bar later assertion, counsel should file motions that raise issues
even if such issues have previously been rejected by the courts.
Similarly, the attorneys must explore the possibility of reaching an
agreed-upon disposition, considering all legal consequences of any
disposition and keeping the client informed of the considerations."'
Counsel should formulate a theory of defense, aiming to avoid
inconsistent guilt and penalty phase assertions," and prepare for the
jury selection process in light of: procedures for selection; potential
legal bases for challenges; and, techniques for rehabilitation of
potential jurors," all with the theory ofdefense in mind. During pretrial and trial stages, counsel should preserve all legal error on the
record for later review. 3
77. Id. at Guideline 10.7 and cmt.
78. Id. at Guideline 10.5. See also Guideline 10.5 and cmt. ("Establishing a
relationship oftrust with the client is essential both to overcome the client's natural
resistance to disclosing the often personal and painful facts necessary to present an
effective penalty phase defense, and to ensure that the client will listen to counsel's
advice on important matters such as whether to testify and the advisability of a plea.
Client contact must be ongoing, and include sufficient time spent at the prison to
develop a rapport between attorney and client. An occasional hurried interview
with the client will not reveal to counsel all the facts needed to prepare for trial,
appeal, post-conviction review, or clemency. Even if counsel manages to ask the
right questions, a client will not-with good reason-trust a lawyer who visits only
a few times before trial, does not send or reply to correspondence in a timely
manner, or refuses to take telephone calls. It is also essential to develop a
relationship of trust with the client's family or others on whom the client relies for
support and advice.").
79. Id. at Guideline 10.8.
80. Id. at Guideline 10.9.1.
81. Id. at Guideline 10.10.1.
82. Id. at Guideline 10.10.2.
83. Id. at Guideline 10.8. The preservation of error is particularly important
in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's holdings in State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d
364 (La. 1996), cert. denied,519 U.S. 860, 117 S.Ct. 162, reh 'gdenied,519 U.S.
1023, 117 S. Ct. 546 (1996) (requiring a contemporaneous objection in the guilt
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Moreover, the defense attorney must prepare any and all options
for sentencing by investigating issues that support mitigation or rebut
the prosecution's case in aggravation, presenting all reasonably
available mitigating evidence that is consistent with the defense
theory, and developing a plan to seek avoidance of the death
penalty.84 In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent
opinion in Atkins v. Virginia,85 counsel must, from the moment ofhis
appointment, begin an evaluation process by a qualified psychology
or psychiatry professional to inquire into the defendant's past and
present mental health and capacity. This process should include an
investigation into any existing mental health records ofthe defendant
as well as information which may be obtained from persons close to
the defendant. Counsel must also prepare for the sentencing phase by
discussing with the client the sentencing alternatives, legal process,
accuracy of information to be presented, consideration of lay and
86
expert witnesses, and the possibility ofhaving the defendant testify.
It is extremely important that counsel determine and make any
necessary legal response to evidence of aggravating factors to be
presented by the prosecution.87 Further, counsel must present all
reasonably available mitigating evidence, including witnesses familiar
with the client's life and development, as well as documentation
concerning the client's medical, educational, employment, military,
and family histories. Any rehabilitative potential ofthe client, record
ofprior offenses or lack thereof, and expert testimony should also be
presented.88 Finally, counsel must preserve the defendant's right to
post-judgment review of the conviction and sentence as well as
cooperate with subsequent counsel regarding trial-level proceedings
and strategies.8 9
Hence, it takes skill and expertise to fully carry out all of the
duties required of capital defense counsel. This skill and expertise
are required for a full understanding of legal issues as well as
physical, scientific, psychological, and sociological evidence. Such
talent and mastery command the respect ofthe court, the prosecution,
and the jury, all ofwhom work hand-in-hand with effective advocacy.
phase of a capital trial) and State v. Wessinger, 736 So. 2d 162 (La. 1999), cert.
denied,528 U.S. 1050, 120 S. Ct. 589 (1999), reh 'gdenied, 528 U.S. 1145, 120 S.
Ct. 1001 (2000) (expanding the contemporaneous objection rule to the penalty
phase of a capital trial).
84. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance offDefense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.11.
85. 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
86. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance ofDefense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.11.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at Guideline 10.13.
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Inexperienced, overworked, and inept attorneys simply cannot match
the resources and proficiency of the prosecutorial and law
enforcement agencies so that the capital defendant receives a
constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.
IV. A LOOK AT ANOTHER PROFESSION'S STANDARDS

A. Specialized Training
Like capital defense counsel, medical surgeons shoulder a grave
responsibility-saving life or losing to death. Likewise, both capital
defense counsel and surgeons must function above a minimum
competence level. Unlike capital defense counsel, surgeons must
successfully complete a rigorous formal training program before
making that first incision. In fact, no other profession or vocation
requires more formal training than surgery.9" This advanced, intense
training is required of surgeons because of the simple fact that their
patients' very lives depend on their expertise.
"General surgery" is a discipline involving knowledge of
anatomy, physiology, metabolism, immunology, nutrition, pathology,
wound healing, shock and resuscitation, intensive care, and neoplasia,
which are common to all surgical specialties. Because ofthe gravity
of his work, a general surgeon must complete a rigorous training
process before he can operate. First, admission to an accredited
medical school requires particular undergraduate studies.92 Also,
after graduation from medical school, a minimum of five years of
formal residency training is required.93 In residency, surgeon
candidates are trained under the supervision of physicians who are
recognized as experts in their field.9 The education during residency
90. Thomas R. McLean, M.D., J.D., M.S., Cybersurgery-AnArgumentfor
EnterpriseLiability, 23 J. Leg. Med. 167, 174 (2002) [hereinafter McLean].
91. See The American Board ofSurgery, Inc., athttp://www.absurgery.org (last
visited Jan. 10, 2004).
92. For example, admission into Tulane School ofMedicine requires successful
completion ofa program which includes at least six semester hours each ofEnglish,
general (inorganic) chemistry, organic chemistry, general physics, and general
biology.
Tulane School of Medicine, Office of Admissions, at
http://www.som.tulane.edu/admissions/require.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
Also, in addition to all other undergraduate requirements, admission into Louisiana
State University School of Medicine at New Orleans requires successful completion
of eight semester hours each of general (inorganic) chemistry, organic chemistry,
physics, biology, and demonstration of a proficiency in written and spoken English.
LSU School of Medicine, Office of Admissions, available at
http://www.medschool.lsumc.edu/admissions/Requirements/default.htm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2004).
93. McLean, supranote 90, at 167 n.38.
94. American Medical Association, available at http://www.ama-
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is "highly experiential and is characterized by close tutor/learner
relationships, with progression of responsibility for the resident as
competencies are developed." '
Further, "the system has many
advantages and, in fact, is held as the gold standard for the education
ofsurgeons worldwide., 96 During this training, candidates who have
completed medical school work closely with experienced surgeons to
gradually refine their skills until they are capable of performing an
entire surgical procedure alone. In addition, board certification is
usually required before a healthcare provider will consider hiring or
contracting with a surgeon for services. Certification by a surgical
board that has been approved by the American Medical Association
reveals that a surgeon has completed residency training and has
demonstrated knowledge and competency by successfully completing
a rigorous examination. 97 Further, board certification programs
require a minimum level of continued medical education in the area
ofexpertise.9"
These raised standards for surgeons are required to ensure
competent performance where a life hangs in the balance. Just as not
any medical doctor, by virtue of his medical school diploma, is
qualified to perform a surgical procedure, not every juris doctor, by
virtue of his law school diploma, is qualified to defend a capital
client. These complex and serious tasks require more than the
minimum training. Just as specialized surgical training beyond
medical school is required before a surgeon may operate, specialized
capital defense training beyond law school should be required before
an attorney may be appointed to litigate a capital case. By way of
comparison, many of the errors represented in Appendix A could
have been avoided if trial counsel had received specialized training.
Specifically, specialized training could have effectively educated the
attorneys about the importance of obtaining and presenting the
exculpatory and mitigating evidence that was neglected, overlooked,
or unappreciated. It would have greatly increased counsel's
understanding of the applicable law so that legal advice would have
been correctly interpreted and explained to the client. Likewise,
specialized training would have improved counsel's performance in
assn.org/aps/physcred.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
95. American
College
of
Surgeons,
available at
http://www.facs.org/dept/serd/gmec/prereqobj.htnl (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
96. Id.
97. American
College
of
Surgeons,
available at
http://www.facs.org/public-info/operation/who.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
98. For example, the American Board of Surgery, Inc. requires diplomates to
complete 100 hours of continuing surgical education before the diplomate will be
considered for recertification (which is applied for every seven years). See the
American
Board
of Surgery,
Inc.,
available at
http://www.absurgery.org/cme_requirements.html (updated Mar. 2002).
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voir dire and motions practice. None of these errors should have
occurred, and most of them could have been prevented.
B. SpecializedReview
By statute, when a patient believes he has a medical malpractice
claim against his physician, that claim is first presented to a medical
review panel9 9 before suit may be instituted. This panel is comprised
ofone attorney and three licensed health care providers" who review
evidence and other proof in making a determination of whether the
physician has breached his duty of appropriate standards ofcare. One
clear advantage of the medical review panel system is that the review
of the defendant physician's acts or omissions is conducted by other
physicians and qualified experts who will recognize a breach in the
health professional's standard of care. The expertise of those
conducting the review is invaluable in the determination of the
existence of liability. The findings of the medical review panel do
not constitute a final judgment but are in the nature of an expert
opinion.'0 ' Nonetheless, the medical review panel's conclusions are
admissible in a subsequent malpractice action.0 2
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court should develop and
administer a system of review for capital defendants who make a
post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.'° 3
An attorney review panel would provide for a review of trial
counsel's actions and inactions by a panel of experienced capital
defense counsel who, like members of the medical review panel, will
recognize counsel's errors. Iferrors are found by the attorney review
panel, the court should defer to those findings in its evidentiary
hearing on post conviction relief. The administration ofsuch a panel
will expedite the court's process of review of post-conviction relief
petitions. The district court's adjudication of a post-conviction relief
claim should include deference to the findings ofthe attorney review
panel inasmuch as the findings will be expert determinations of the
existence or nonexistence of ineffectiveness.

99. La. R.S. 40:1299.39.1(A)(1) (2003).
100. La. R.S. 40:1299.39.1(C)(1) (2003).
101. Derouen v. Kolb, 397 So. 2d 791 (La. 1981).
102. Smith v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 658 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1995),
writ denied, 662 So. 2d 3 (La. 1995).
103. See State v. Stowe, 635 So. 2d 168 (La. 1994); State v. Deloch, 380 So. 2d
67 (La. 1980) (Generally, the preference for addressing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel is a post-conviction proceeding in the trial court, not on
appeal. The rationale behind such procedure is that a full evidentiary hearing may
be conducted to explore the issue.).
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FOR THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT To ACT

It is my hope and belief that the Nation will soon come to
realize that capital punishment cannot morally or
constitutionallybe imposed. Until that time, however, we must
have the courage to recognize the failings of our present
system ofcapitalrepresentationandthe conviction to do what
is necessaryto improve it.
-Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun"°
Every death row inmate represents a lifetime ofreasons to raise
the competency standards for attorneys litigating capital cases in
Louisiana. In any event, ninety-seven percent of thirty of the past
reversals or remands based on ineffectiveness nationwide were for
acts or omissions that could have been avoided with additional
experience and specialized training. These acts and omissions were
not based on strategy. They were pure ineffectiveness in its rawest
form. Though Louisiana courts are not as quick to reverse or
remand, the same errors are being committed by Louisiana's trial
counsel.
Indeed, certain character traits exist which experience and
training cannot cure. An attorney with an overly antagonistic
personality probably will not stop making juries angry at him and
his client just because he has additional training. Likewise,
specialty training will not prevent a drunkard from consuming
intoxicants during lunch breaks and other judicial recesses, despite
the gravity of his client's fate. In Burdine v. Johnson,'°5 trial
counsel slept during the guilt phase of defendant's capital murder
trial. The Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where
"defense counsel repeatedly slept as evidence was being introduced
against a defendant, that defendant has been denied counsel at a
critical stage of his trial"' 6 in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Admittedly, specialized training will not cure counsel's narcolepsy.
If these irreparable kinds of errors continue to arise, no specialized
training could ever cure the capital defense system. Indeed, no
amount of state funding, education, or other assistance would ever
provide any assurance to society or capital defendants that their
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective assistance
of counsel are being protected. Such an unfair administration of
104. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1264, 114 S.Ct. 2785, 2790 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial ofcertiorari)(mem.).
105. 262 F.3d 336 (2001) (on rehearing, en banc), cert.denied,535 U.S. 1120,
122 S.Ct. 2347 (2002).
106. 262 F.3d at 338.
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capital punishment would require that the State discontinue the use
of the death penalty as a criminal sanction altogether since the
Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Louisiana
mandate a fair trial.
Nonetheless, just as a surgeon takes his patient's life in his
hands when the first incision is made, a capital defense attorney
takes his client's life in his hands the moment he is appointed or
retained to represent him. If the State ofLouisiana wants to impose
the death penalty for qualified defendants, the State of Louisiana
should be responsible for training, and funding such training of,
specialized counsel for the grave responsibility that accompanies a
capital case. This specialized training should mirror that of a
surgeon in several important aspects. Specifically, the State should
provide and fund in-depth education programs to train counsel on:
1) the many aspects and importance of fully investigating every
angle of their client's defense, including both guilt- and mitigationphase issues; 2) the intricacies and elements of ever-evolving
physical and forensic evidence; 3) personal relationship skills in
dealing with clients, clients' family members, and other witnesses;
and, 4) ever-evolving legal issues as they affect capital
representation.
Further, an examination, written or oral, should be administered
to ensure that applicants have obtained the minimum necessary
expertise from these educational programs.
A specialized
examination for a specialized field of practice is not a foreign idea
to the law. To practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, attorneys must fulfill certain undergraduate
requirements as well as successfully complete a six-hour
examination designed to test the applicant's knowledge of patent
law; procedure, rules, and practice of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office; and other specialized issues involved in that
field." 7 If courts have accepted the examination requirements in
patent law where mere money in the form of royalties is at stake,
surely a minimum standards examination should be administered
where human lives are at stake.
In addition, inexperienced trial counsel should slowly gain
control of the trial reins under the close supervision of a highly
qualified and skilled capital defense lawyer who will mentor the
inexperienced until his or her skills and expertise are gradually
refined similar to the surgeon's residencyrequirements. The mentor
should educate the mentee in all respects of representing a capital
107. See United States Patent and Trademark
Office, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/gcounsel/oed.htm (last visited Jan. 10,

2004).
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defendant.
Once the specialized training and "residency"
requirements have been satisfied, then and only then should counsel
be certified to represent capital defendants. To maintain that highly
specialized certification, however, counsel should be required to
attend and successfully complete specialized continuing education
programs which focus on the aspects ofcapital representation. This
training should educate counsel on investigatory techniques so that
counsel may either effectively obtain all information himself or
supervise professional investigating personnel. Likewise, training
should prepare counsel to understand the importance of the
information obtained through investigation, and how to use the
information in negotiations with the prosecution. Also, training
should cover both how to obtain additional information, and how to
present information to the jury in a cohesive and comprehensive
fashion, so that: 1)counsel's defense theory is advanced; and, 2) the
jury, if necessary, may make an informed decision regarding
penalty. Similarly, training should provide in-depth analysis of the
legal principles specific to capital litigation such as voir dire issues,
specialized motions practice, and ethical considerations unique to
capital defense. The training should also educate counsel on oral
advocacy skills, presentation and rebuttal of scientific and other
physical evidence, and skills in building and maintaining a
relationship with the client and his family, all ofwhich is paramount
to effective representation.
Likewise, the creation ofa system of attorney review panels will
provide the convicted capital defendant with a qualitative review of
his trial counsel's performance. The review should be conducted by
experienced capital defense litigators who are capable of
recognizing ineffectiveness at the trial level. Further, this system of
review will expeditiously assist the court in determining whether the
capital defendant has been denied his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel. Indeed, the State of Louisiana must
fund each of these steps recommended for improvement of the
capital defense system. Providing appropriate education and
specialized training will be expensive.
Administration of
examinations, continued legal education, and maintenance of an
attorney review panel may cost exorbitant amounts of money. The
current system of direct appeals, post-conviction relief petitions,
and federal habeas claims also costs exorbitant amounts of money
and time, but it does not work. To fairly and justly administer
capital punishment in Louisiana, the changes recommended in this
article should be instituted and funded by the state. If the State of
Louisiana is unable or unwilling to provide such funding, it cannot
constitutionally continue to seek capital sentences.
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CONCLUSION

Enough for my purpose at present that new times and new
manners may callfor new standardsandnew rules.
-Benjamin N. Cardozo08
Under Louisiana's current standards, inept counsel are appointed
to represent capital defendants, whose lives stand in deadly peril.
When the defendant is convicted, sentenced to death, and seeks
reversal based on counsel's apparent ineffectiveness, the court merely
dismisses the defendant's claim for failing to meet the Strickland
burden. Surely the Sixth Amendment means more than that. The
proposed certification scheme for capital defense counsel would
provide much greater assurance that the defendant's constitutional
rights are being protected and that the criminal justice system is
acquitting the innocent while convicting the guilty. Since death, in
its finality, is different, all of the judicial resources that are currently
expended on reviews of direct appeals, post-conviction relief
applications, and petitions for writs of habeas should be used to
implement this proposed system. Since death, in its finality, is
different, capital counsel should be different. Qualitatively different.
JulieHayes Kilborn*

108. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 88 (1921).
* The author extends special appreciation to Phyllis Mann and Tom Lorenzi
for their invaluable insight and support during the creation of this article. Thanks

are also due to Professors Christine Corcos, Paul Baier, and James Bowers for their
guidance and encouragement during this writing.
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Counsel failed to
investigate,
obtain, or present
any evidence of
mitigation to
sentencing jury.

Appeal of
denial of
federal
habeas
relief.

Brownlee v.
Haley
306 F.3d 1043
(1lth Cir.
9/16/02)

Death
sentence
vacated
and
remanded.
4
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Knese v. State
85 S.W.3d 628
(Mo. 8/27/02)

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief.

Counsel failed to
read jury
questionnaires
until after trial
and failed to voir
dire as to death
qualification,
where one juror's
questionnaire
response
indicated an
automatic vote
for death after
conviction.

Death
sentence
vacated
and
remanded
for new
penalty
phase.

Simmons v.
Luebbers, 299
F.3d 929 (11th
Cir. 8/14/02)

Appeal of
denial of
federal
habeas
relief,

Counsel failed to
introduce
available mental
health
information and
other mitigating
evidence.

Reversed
in part and
remanded
for new
penalty
phase.
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Miller v.
Straub
299 F.3d 570
(6th Cir.
8/08/02)

Appeal by
state of
federal
habeas
relief
(where
fifteen yearold
defendant
received life
sentence).

Defendant pled
guilty to first
degree murder.
Trial court
imposed juvenile
sentence. State
appealed wanting
adult life
sentence.
Defendant moved
to withdraw plea.
Counsel failed to
consider the
likelihood of and
to advise
defendant about
state's right to
appeal the
imposition of a
juvenile sentence.

Affirmed.

Fortenberry v.
Haley 297
F.3d 1213
(11 th Cir.
7/17/02)

Appeal of
denial of
federal
habeas
relief.

Counsel failed to
prepare for and
present evidence
in penalty phase.
(Court held there
was no
constitutional
violation because
there was no
prejudice to the
defendant under
the Strickland
test.)

Affirmed.

Turner v.
Calderon 281
F.3d 851 (9th
Cir. 2/12/02)

Appeal of
denial of
federal
habeas
relief,

Counsel failed to
investigate and
present mitigating
evidence during
penalty phase.

Reversed
and
remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

Appeal of
denial of
federal
habeas
relief.

Silva v.
Woodford
2779 F.3d 825
(9th Cir.
2/01/02)

I

Appeal of
denial of
federal
habeas
relief.

Counsel failed to
investigate or
present a
potential
alternative
defense despite
evidence in
counsel's
possession that
supported the
alternative theory,
but rather counsel
presented a
defense in which
counsel had no
belief.

Appeal of
denial of
federal
habeas
relief.

Counsel failed to
investigate
defendant's
personal history
and present
evidence of such
at the penalty
phase, and
counsel presented
a deficient
penalty phase
closing argument.

Reversed
and
remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

I

I

Coleman v.
Mitchell
268 F.3d 417
(6th Cir.
10/10/01)

Death
sentence
reversed
and
remanded
for new
sentencing
hearing.

Counsel failed to
investigate and
present
potentially
compelling
mitigation
evidence during
penalty phase.
4.

*

Phillips v.
Woodford
267 F.3d 966
(9th Cir.
10/15/01)
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Death
sentence
reversed
and
remanded
for new
sentencing
hearing.
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U.S. ex rel.
Erickson v.
Schomig
162 F. Supp.2d
1020 (N.D. Ill.
9/28/01)

Petition for
writ of
habeas.

Counsel failed to
investigate and
learn that
defendant's sole
mitigation
witness, who had
been hired by
defendant's
family, was a
fraud.

Death
sentence
vacated.

Burdine v.
Johnson
262 F.3d 336
(5th Cir.
8/13/01)

Appeal by
state of
grant of
federal
habeas
relief.

Counsel slept
during guilt phase
of defendant's
capital murder
trial.

Conviction
vacated.

Cook v.
Florida
792 So. 2d
1197 (Fla.
6/28/01)

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief,

Counsel failed to
properly
investigate the
mental mitigators
and defendant's
family and
personal
background.
Counsel waited
until the day
before the penalty
phase hearing to
seek assistance of
a mental health
expert.

Reversed
and
remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.
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168

Appeal of
denial of
habeas
relief.

Evans v.
Nevada
28 P.3d 498
(Nev. 7/24/01)

4.

1

4.

Death
sentence
reversed
and
remanded
for new
penalty
heaing.

Counsel failed to
object to the
prosecutor's
misstatement to
jurors ofhow to
employ evidence
in the penalty
phase.

Prowell v.
Indiana
741 N.E.2d
704 (Ind.
1/11/01)

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief.

Counsel advised
defendant to
plead guilty to
two murders
because counsel
"was afraid to try
his case;" counsel
was unprepared
for the penalty
phase; counsel
failed to timely
retain mental
health experts;
and counsel
presented
inconsistent
evidence to the
court in
mitigation.

Remanded
for vacate
of guilty
plea,
rescission
ofdeath
sentence,
and new
trial.

Sanford v.
Arkansas
25 S.W.3d 414
(Ark. 9/14/00)

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief.

Counsel failed to
investigate and
present available
mitigating
evidence,

Death
sentence
reversed
and
remanded
for
resentencin

g.

2003]

169

COMMENTS

McNair v.
Haley
97 F. Supp.2d
1270 (M.D.
Ala. 5/11/00)

Petition for
writ of
habeas.

Counsel failed to
obtain and
present
independent
expert witnesses
in guilt phase;
failed to develop
adequate theory
of mitigation in
phase; failed to
present
independent
expert witnesses
at penalty phase.

Remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

Mayes v.
Gibson
210 F.3d 1284
(10th Cir.
5/04/00)

Appeal of
denial of
habeas
relief,

Counsel failed to
conduct any
investigation or
present any
mitigation
evidence except
for defendant's
own brief
testimony during
the penalty phase.

Remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

Com. v.
Nieves
746 A.2d 1102
(Pa. 2/17/00)

Direct
appeal.

Counsel advised
defendant not to
testify during the
guilt phase based
on an erroneous
interpretation of
the law.

Death
sentence
vacated
and
remanded
for new
trial.
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Case Name &
Citation

Type of
Proceeding

Brown v.
Mississippi
749 So. 2d 82
(Miss.
11/04/99)

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief,

Ineffective Acts I
Omissions
of Trial Counsel
Counsel failed to
seek an
independent
medical
examination after
the state hospital
examined
defendant but
would not
produce a report.
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Ho
Remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

2003]

Moore v.
Johnson
194 F.3d 586
(5th Cir.
10/27/99)

COMMENTS

On remand
from United
States
Supreme
Court on
petition for
federal
habeas
relief.

Counsel failed to
properly handle
defendant's
confession during
the guilt phase;
counsel rendered
deficient
performance by
eliciting
damaging
evidence far
beyond the scope
of direct
examination in
the cross
examination of
the state's first
witness; and
counsel failed to
investigate,
develop, or
present available
mitigating
evidence relating
to defendant's
background,
contention that
the shooting was
accidental, and
defendant's
prison record
during the
punishment phase
of trial.

Death
sentence
vacated
and
remanded
for
imposition
of sentence
less than
death or
for new
sentencing
hearing.
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4

4

4

Davis v.
Mississippi
743 So. 2d 326
(Miss. 7/1/99)

Motion to
Vacate
Judgment
and/or
Sentence.

Death
sentence
vacated
and
remanded
for
imposition
of sentence
less than
death or
for new
sentencing
hearing.

Counsel failed to
call defendant's
former attorney to
testify that
defendant was
aware prior to
date of murder
that victim was
no longer a
potential witness
in pending assault
and probation
violation cases,
which testimony
would have
negated the
state's alleged
aggravating
circumstance.

Appeal of
denial of
habeas
relief.

Parker v.
Bowersox
188 F.3d 923
(8th Cir.
8/10/99)

[Vol. 64

Counsel failed to
(1) investigate the
existence of
character
witnesses and
inadequately
prepared and
examined the
ones presented;
(2) move to quash
the jury based on
improper contact
with the state; (3)
explain a plea
bargain offer to
defendant; (4)
request a special
jury venire prior
to the trial date.

Remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

COMMENYS

2003]

4

4

4

Rondon v.
Indiana
711 N.E.2d
506 (Ind.
5/25/99)

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief.

Remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

Counsel failed to
investigate,
develop and
present
significant
mitigating
evidence,
including a
history of mental
health treatment,
and develop a
potential
diminished
capacity defense.

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief.

Com. v.
Williams
732 A.2d 1167
(Pa. 6/04/99)

Counsel failed to
present mitigating
evidence of
defendant's
background,
childhood, and
mental health
history, and
limited mitigation
investigation to
the two to three
years prior to
defendant's
arrest; counsel
admitted that they
neglected penalty
phase
preparations until
the night before
the penalty phase
of trial.

Death
sentence
reversed
and
remanded
for new
penalty
phase.
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U.S.v.
Gilmore
35 F. Supp.2d
626 (N.D. Ill.
1/22/99),
reversed 223
F. 3d 626 (7th
Cir. 5/31/00)

Petition for
federal
habeas
relief.

Counsel failed to
seek a psychiatric
expert until after
the guilty verdict,
then decided not
to call the expert,
leaving the
defense with no
meaningful
mitigation
evidence.

Petition
granted.

Brimmer v.
Tennessee
29 S.W.3d 497
(Tenn.
9/15/98)

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief,

Counsel failed to
effectively
prepare or present
psychological
testimony in the
sentencing phase.

Remanded
for new
sentencing
hearing.

Ex parte
Patterson
969 S.W.2d 16
(Tex. Crim.
App. 6/10/98)

Petition for
writ of
habeas.

Counsel failed to
investigate the
validity of or
object to the use
of defendant's
prior convictions
offered for
enhancement
purposes.

Remanded
for
evidentiary
hearing.

Abdur'Rahma
n v. Bell
999 F. Supp.
1073- (M.D.
Tenn. 4/08/98)

Petition for
writ of
habeas.

Counsel failed to
investigate or
present any
mitigating
evidence despite
its availability
and abundance.

Petition
granted;
death
sentence
vacated
and
remanded.

**

See supra note 33.

COMMENTS

2003]

Appeal of
denial of
postconviction
relief.

Sheridan v.
Arkansas
959 S.W.2d 29
(Ark. 1/08/98)

4.

4.

4

Williamson v.
Ward
110 F.3d 1508
(10th Cir.
4/10/97)

Appeal by
state of
grant of writ
ofhabeas.

Reversed
and
remanded
for new
trial.

Counsel
represented
defendant and
defend-ant's
brother, both
charged with the
same murder, and
counsel worked a
plea agreement
for the brother in
exchange for the
brother's
testimony against
defendant.
Counsel failed to
fully investigate
defendant's
history ofmental
illness, failed to
seek a
competency
determination,
failed to
challenge the
credibility of
defendant's
confession, and
failed to
investigate and
present the fact
that another man
had confessed to
the crime.

Writ of
habeas
granted.

